SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of

recent United States and New Jersey Supreme Court cases of interest to
practitioners. In so doing we hope to assist the legal community in
keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant
areas of practice.
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TRANSACTION-

TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE Is NOT AVAILABLE TO A PRIVATE CONTRACTOR AGAINST A
STATE LAW CLAIM WHERE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S SPECIFICATIONS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT Do NOT ADDRESS SAFETY
FEATURES AND THE OMISSION DOES NOT RESULT FROM THE DISCRETIONARY DECISION OF A GOVERNMENT OFFmILAL-Anzalone v.

WesTech Gear Corp., 141 N.J. 256, 661 A.2d 796 (1995) (per
curiam).
On March 20, 1987, the United States Navy employed plaintiff
John Anzalone as a civilian steward aboard a naval vessel used for
refueling other naval ships at sea. 141 N.J. at 259, 661 A.2d at 797
(Handler, J., concurring). In the midst of a refueling operation,
the plaintiff was injured.
When a refueling operation occurs at sea, the Navy uses a wire
rope known as "spanwire" to connect the delivering and receiving
ships. The spanwire provides support for the fuel lines. The tension and amount of spanwire are controlled by a device called a
"ram tensioner." The plaintiff was injured when he tripped and
fell near an open and unguarded area of the ram tensioner. While
falling, he reached up and grabbed one of the spanwires being fed
into the machine. The plaintiffs left hand was partially amputated
as a result.
Anzalone subsequently filed suit against WesTech Gear Corporation ("WesTech"), the government contractor that provided the
ram tensioner to the Navy. Plaintiff alleged that the ram tensioner
was defectively designed and manufactured. Consequently, plaintiff claimed that WesTech was liable for distributing and installing
a defective product. WesTech asserted that the product was furnished in

accordance with federal government requirements.

Therefore, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs claim was
barred by the government contractor defense. Id., 661 A.2d at 79798 (Handler, J., concurring).
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 260, 661 A.2d at 798 (Handler, J., concurring).
The trial court found that Anzalone's claim was barred by the government contractor defense because the ram tensioner conformed
to the Navy's detailed specifications, which did not include any
safety features for the area of the equipment which caused the
plaintiff's injury. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
reversed the lower court's dismissal. Id. (citation omitted). The
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Appellate Division held that the government contractor defense
did not apply because the Navy's contract specifications did not
prohibit WesTech from including safety features. Id. (citation
omitted). The NewJersey Supreme Court granted the defendant's
petition for certification. Id. at 257, 661 A.2d at 796. Equally divided, the court issued a one-sentence per curiam decision affirming the Appellate Division's ruling. Id.
Justice Handler, joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice
Stein, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 258, 278, 661 A.2d at 797,
807 (Handler, J., concurring). The concurrence held that the government contractor defense did not apply because the federal government's contract specifications for the ram tensioner did not
prevent the defendant from meeting its independent state law duty
to provide a safe product. Id. at 260, 661 A.2d at 798 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
The concurrence began its analysis by noting that the government contractor defense was articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988). Id. In Boyle, the court noted, the father of a United States
Marine Corps helicopter pilot brought an action for the wrongful
death of his son. Id. The court stated that the victim drowned during a training mission when his helicopter crashed in the ocean.
Id. As the helicopter submerged, the court relayed, water pressure
prevented the pilot from escaping through the outward-opening
escape hatch. Id. As a result, the court expounded, the plaintiff
sued the manufacturer of the product under Virginia law alleging
that the craft was defectively designed because the escape hatch
did not open inward. Id. In response, the court noted, the manufacturer argued that the federal government's contract specifications required the hatch to open outward. Id. at 260-61, 661 A.2d
at 798 (Handler, J., concurring).
After thoroughly discussing the facts and policies at work in
Boyle, Justice Handler recited the Boyle court's central holding that
federal government contracting is so clearly committed to federal
control, that a federal government contract may preempt state law
whenever a "significant conflict" exists between the two. Id. at 26062, 262, 661 A.2d at 798-99, 799 (Handler, J., concurring) (citations and quotation omitted). To determine if a significant conflict exists in a design-defect case, the concurrence continued, the
Boyle court formulated a three-part test. Id. at 263, 661 A.2d at 799
(Handler, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In essence, Justice
Handler observed that the Boyle test preempts state law, which
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would otherwise hold federal government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment, when "'(1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.'" Id.
(quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).
After stating the elements of the Boyle test, the concurrence
noted that the majority of courts considering the government contractor defense in design-defect cases utilize the three-part test to
determine if a significant conflict exists. Id., 661 A.2d at 799-800
(Handler, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The concurring
opinion agreed with the reasoning of these courts. Id. at 264, 661
A.2d at 800 (Handler, J., concurring). Consequenly, the concurrence framed the issue as whether a significant conflict existed between New Jersey's product liability law and the federal
government's contract specifications for the ram tensioner. Id.
In applying this standard, Justice Handler stated that the court
must determine the more "basic" question of whether the equipment was designed to meet reasonably precise specifications that
had been approved by the federal government. Id. at 265, 661
A.2d at 800 (Handler, J., concurring). After reviewing the factual
record, the concurrence concluded that the ram tensioner specifications were devised and approved by the federal government. Id.
at 265-66, 266, 661 A.2d at 800-01, 801 (Handler, J., concurring).
Moreover, the concurring justices found that the equipment was
delivered and installed under the guidance and control of the federal government. Id. Finally, the concurring opinion concluded
that the overall specifications for the equipment were detailed and
precise. Id.
Justice Handler observed that the Boyle decision suggests that a
significant conflict between the federal contract and state law does
not automatically arise by simply showing that the federal government approved of reasonably precise specifications. Id. at 266-67,
661 A.2d at 801 (Handler, J., concurring). Interpreting Boyle, the
concurrence reasoned that a conflict would not arise if the private
contractor is capable of complying with the federal government's
contract specifications and an independent state law. Id. (citation
omitted).
The concurring opinion distinguished Anzalone's factual allegations from those raised in Boyle. Id. at 267-68, 661 A.2d at 802
(Handler,J., concurring). In Boyle,Justice Handler observed, it was
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impossible for the government contractor to comply with its duties
under both federal and state law. Id. at 267, 661 A.2d at 802 (Handler, J., concurring). By contrast, the concurring opinion found
no "precisely contrary" duties existed with regard to the safety feature at issue in the present case. Id. Rather, the concurrence
noted, the government's specifications simply did not address the
issue of safety at all. Id. Thus, Justice Handler concluded that the
government contract neither prohibited nor required the installation of a safety device that would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 267-68, 661 A.2d at 802 (Handler, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, the concurrence recognized that the omission of
a specification does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of a
significant conflict between the government contract and state law.
Id. at 268, 661 A.2d at 802 (Handler, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Handler noted that a significant conflict could still arise if the
omission resulted from the deliberate decision of a government official. Id. (citations and quotation omitted). Thus, the justice concluded that the court must consider whether the record indicates
that the omission of a safety device resulted from a conscious and
deliberate decision of a government official. Id. at 270-71, 271, 661
A.2d at 803, 804 (Handler, J., concurring). After reviewing the
record, the concurrence found, by comparing the lack of safety
guidelines to the otherwise detailed specifications for the product,
that the omission of a safety feature was not the result of a deliberate federal government decision. Id. at 271-72, 272, 661 A.2d at
804 (Handler, J., concurring).
Ultimately, the concurring opinion found that a safety feature
could have been required under state tort law without causing a
significant conflict with WesTech's duties under the federal government contract. Id. at 273, 661 A.2d at 805 (Handler, J., concurring). In Justice Handler's view, the defendant was capable of
meeting its obligations under both the federal government contract and state tort law. Id. at 273-74, 661 A.2d at 805 (Handler, J.,
concurring). Consequently, the concurrence concluded that the
government contractor defense was not available in this case to displace the defendant's state tort law duties. Id. at 274, 661 A.2d at
805 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Pollock filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
O'Hern and Justice Garibaldi joined. Id. at 274, 278, 661 A.2d at
805, 807 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed with the concurrence that the Boyle test was the proper standard for determining whether a significant conflict existed. Id. (Pollock, J.,
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dissenting) (quotation omitted). Justice Pollock, however, disagreed with the concurrence's application of Boyle to this case. Id.
at 275, 661 A.2d at 806 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the concurrence for failing to apply the three-part Boyle test
to determine if a significant conflict existed. Id. at 276, 661 A.2d at
806 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Injustice Pollock's view, the concurrence effectively replaced the three-part Boyle test with its own
formula for ascertaining whether a significant conflict existed. Id.
Once the concurrence found that the equipment was manufactured in accordance with reasonably precise specifications approved by the federal government, Justice Pollock contended, the
inquiry should have ended. Id. at 275-76, 661 A.2d at 806 (Pollock,
J., dissenting). To proceed beyond this point to infer that the defendant had a duty because the federal government did not explicitly forbid the installation of a safety device, Justice Pollock
continued, "stands Boyle on its head." Id. at 275, 661 A.2d at 806
(Pollock, J., dissenting).
Justice Pollock asserted that the concurrence reached this result by misinterpreting Boyle. Id. The dissent pointed out that the
Boyle test expressly distinguishes situations where the product is
designed and manufactured by the contractor from those where
the equipment is designed by, or in conjunction with, government
personnel and simply built by the private contractor in accordance
with the government's specifications. Id. at 277, 661 A.2d 807 (Pollock, J., dissenting). In the latter case, Justice Pollock argued, the
government contractor defense should apply. Id.
The dissent buttressed this conclusion by noting the rationale
for the government contract defense provided by the United States
Supreme Court in Boyle. Id. at 278, 661 A.2d at 807 (Pollock, J.,
dissenting) (quotation omitted). Since the United States Navy
would be immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (Supp. 1995), if the Navy had produced the
equipment itself, Justice Pollock reasoned that it made little sense
to create liability against the contractor when the Navy contracts
for the production of the same equipment. Id. (quotation omitted). In Justice Pollock's view, such a result would violate legislative policy. Id.
In a zeal to provide the plaintiff with relief, the concurring
opinion disregarded the primary basis for the creation of the government contractor defense: to shield the federal government
from the costs of product liability suits. As the dissent correctly
observed, Congress has immunized the federal government from
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tort liability through the Federal Tort Claims Act. In Boyle, the
United States Supreme Court explained that the government contractor defense is aimed at preventing this legislative policy from
being indirectly subverted by government contractors who will undoubtedly pass the costs of product liability suits through to the
government in the form of higher contract prices. Anzalone v. Westech Gear Corp., 141 N.J. 256, 276, 661 A.2d 796, 806 (1995) (Pollock, J., diseenting) (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988)). At a time when elected officials at
the national and state level are under pressure to produce tort and
budgetary reform, the concurrence's decision undermines both
goals.
Moreover, by ignoring the strict parameters of the United
States Supreme Court's three-part test to determine if a significant
conflict exists, the concurrence places the state judiciary in the position of second-guessing and, in effect, overruling federal government military decisions. In Boyle, the United States Supreme Court
held that state law must yield to federal government contracts for
military equipment when those products are manufactured in accordance with reasonably precise specifications approved by the
federal government. Anzalone, 141 N.J. at 262-63, 661 A.2d at 799.
This holding implicitly recognizes that the creation of federal government contract specifications is committed to the executive
branch. The need for any necessary safety devices is evaluated by
executive branch officials charged with the duty of formulating the
appropriate contract specifications. As part of the overall design of
the product, these officials are entrusted with the responsibility of
balancing the need for safety measures against various military performance objectives. Requiring courts to engage in a subsequent
balancing of these factors for products which conform with federal
government contract specifications violates basic separation of
powers principles.
Thus, by stretching Boyle beyond its limits to provide the plaintiff with a recovery, the concurring opinion ignores clear expressions of legislative intent and contravenes basic separation of
powers principles. Such a results-oriented analysis cannot be supported in a legal system built upon the principled rule of law.
Craig A. Domalewski
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PARTNERSHIP

LAW-INCOMING PARTNER'S LIABILrIY-UNDER
THE NEW JERSEY STATUTE DEFINING LIABILITY OF INCOMING
PARTNERS, AN INCOMING PARTNER Is NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE

TO THE PARTNERSHIP'S CREDITORS FOR INTEREST WHICH AcCRUED ON PREEXISTING DEBT AFTER THE PARTNER JOINED THE

PARTNERSHIP-Conklin Farm v. Leibowitz, 140 N.J. 417, 658 A.2d
1257 (1995).
Paula Hertzberg, Elliot Leibowitz, and Joel Leibowitz formed a
general partnership, LongView Estates ("LongView") in 1986 to
purchase from the plaintiff, Conklin Farm ("Conklin"), a 100 acre
tract for the purpose of building a residential condominium complex. 140 N.J. at 418, 658 A.2d at 1257. LongView executed a
promissory note for $9 million in favor of Conklin on the day that
the parties formed the partnership. A mortgage on the property
secured the promissory note which constituted a share of the
purchase price for the property. The three partners signed the
promissory note as partners and also personally guaranteed the
note. The principal amount of the note plus any unpaid interest
was due on January 15, 1992, interest payments were due monthly,
and interest accrued annually at eight and a quarter percent for
the first year and at nine percent thereafter. Id. at 418-19, 658 A.2d
at 1257-58.
In 1987, LongView executed a second promissory note in the
amount of $78 million dollars, to the predecessor of Chemical
Bank. Id. at 419, 658 A.2d at 1258. A mortgage on the property
secured the note as did personal guarantees signed by the partners.
The annual interest rate was set at one percent above the bank's
prime lending rate and interest was payable monthly.
Defendant, Doris Leibowitz, became the owner of a thirty percent interest in LongView on March 15, 1990. On that date her
husband Joel Leibowitz, assigned to her his interest in LongView.
From the time that Doris Leibowitz acquired her interest in LongView to the time that she assigned the interest back to her husband, a period of seventeen months, interest accrued at a rate of
nine percent on the entire outstanding principal of $9 million.
In March of 1991, LongView filed for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code after the condominium
project failed, and LongView defaulted on both notes. LongView
continued operation first as a debtor in possession and subsequently as a trustee until June of 1993 when the Bankruptcy Court
converted the case from Chapter 11, reorganization, to Chapter 7,
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liquidation. Id. at 420, 658 A.2d at 1258. The three original partners sought personal bankruptcy protection and accordingly were
absolved from any personal liability on the notes.
Conklin then sued Doris Leibowitz for thirty percent of the
interest that accrued during the seventeen month period that she
had been a partner. Conklin asserted that although the note was
preexisting debt, the interest that accrued during the period in
which she acted as partner was new debt and therefore claimed
that she was personally liable. Chemical Bank instituted a similar
suit and the cases were consolidated. Doris Leibowitz filed a summary judgment motion. Conklin and Chemical filed cross motions
for summary judgement. The parties stipulated, for the purpose of
determining whether Doris Leibowitz was liable for the interest,
that she had been a partner of LongView.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, in considering
whether an incoming partner could be held personally liable for
interest that accrued on preexisting debt after the new partner had
been admitted, held that interest was not new debt, rather it was
part of the preexisting debt and, as such, the incoming partner was
not personally liable for the interest payments. Id. at 421, 658 A.2d
at 1259. The trial court reasoned that the obligation to pay interest
arises from the written instrument evidencing the debt, therefore
interest does not have a separate debt status from the underlying
obligation. Id. at 424, 658 A.2d at 1259. Applying N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:1-17 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995), the court found that as an
incoming partner, Doris Leibowitz could only be liable to the extent of her interest in the partnership property and she therefore
was not personally liable for the interest that accrued during her
time as partner because the partnership property was worthless. Id.
The court thus granted her motion for summary judgment. Id. at
421, 658 A.2d at 1259. Conklin filed a motion to appeal. Id.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. Adopting Conklin's argument, the appellate division, ruled that interest on a preexisting
debt is new debt, therefore N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17 did not preclude
holding Doris Leibowitz liable personally for the interest that accrued during the period in which she was a partner. Id. First, the
court stated that N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17 was promulgated to protect a
partnership's preexisting creditors, any protection afforded incoming partners was "merely incidental" to that purpose. Id. at 424,
658 A.2d at 1261. Second, the court adopted the argument put
forth by Conklin that interest and rent are analogous. Id. Based
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on those grounds, the appellate division concluded that Doris
Leibowitz was personally liable for the interest. Id. at 421, 658 A.2d
at 1259.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the appellate division's judgment. Id. The court held that
contractual interest is a preexisting debt because the interest obligation arose simultaneously, when LongView executed the Conklin
promissory note, not separately, as a distinct obligation. Id. at 430,
658 A.2d at 1263. Since the interest was preexisting debt Doris
Leibowitz was not personally liable under N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17. Id.,
658 A.2d at 1259.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Garibaldi began the
court's analysis by examining the plain language and legislative history of N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17. Id. at 421, 658 A.2d at 1259. The statute,
the court stated, defines the limits of liability for a new partner who
joins an established partnership. Id. After examining the history
of section 17 of the Uniform Partnership Act, which was adopted
by New Jersey in 1919 and is the source for N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17, the
court concluded that, as adopted, the act was designed to protect
both preexisting creditors and incoming partners. Id. at 422, 658
A.2d at 1259. Justice Garibaldi explained that the act protects preexisting creditors by making incoming partners liable for preexisting debt, and protects incoming partners by limiting the liability
for preexisting debt to partnership property. Id. Thus, the court
dismissed the appellate division's conclusion that incoming partners were only incidentally protected by N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17. Id. at
423, 658 A.2d at 1260 (citation omitted).
Next, Justice Garibaldi, denounced the appellate division's
adoption of Conklin's argument that interest is analogous to rent
and therefore should be considered new debt. Id. at 424-25, 658
A.2d at 1261. The court found the rent analogy faulty stating that
contractual interest is "'an integral part of the debt itself'", not separable from the debt-creating instrument. Id. at 425, 658 A.2d at
1261 (quotation omitted). Rejecting Conklin's argument, the
court distinguished Ellingson v. Walsh, O'Connor & Barneson, 104

P.2d 507 (Cal. 1940), a California Supreme Court case, on which
Conklin relied for the holding that an incoming partner was liable
for the rent due after his admission, although he had not been a
partner at the time the partnership signed the lease. Id. at 426, 658
A.2d at 1261. Justice Garibaldi stressed that although the California court found the incoming partner liable for the rent, it did not
hold that the incoming partner was liable for the preexisting lease
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obligation. Id. The court further contrasted the holding in Ellingson by noting that unlike rent, payment of interest did not arise out
of a independent common law obligation, but rather arose only
upon execution of the note. Id. at 426-27, 658 A.2d at 1262. Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the holding in Ellingson rested
solely on the common law obligation to pay rent which arises from
occupancy or use of the premises regardless of the existence of a
lease, whereas the obligation to pay interest is dependent upon
existence of a promissory note. Id. Accordingly, the majority rejected Conklin's rent analogy. Id. at 427, 658 A.2d at 1262.
The court then turned its attention to Barbro Realty Co. v. Newburger,53 A.D.2d 34 (N.Y. 1976), another case upon which Conklin
relied to support its assertion of liability. Id. Noting that the Barbro
court relied on Ellingson and In re Ryan, 60 N.E.2d 817 (N.Y. 1945),
the court proceeded to discuss the holding in Ryan. Justice Garibaldi again focused on the fact that the Ryan court differentiated
between the obligation to pay rent and interest. Id. at 427, 658
A.2d at 1262. Significantly, the justice remarked, the New York
court found that unlike a loan, where the obligations of both the
lender and the creditor are set at the time the loan instrument is
executed, a lease creates an obligation on the lessee which is contingent on the lessor's fulfillment of his continuing obligation to
allow occupancy. Id. Therefore the rent obligation does not technically arise until the due date of the rent. Id. (citations omitted).
The court stated that because Conklin had fulfilled its obligation to
convey the property to LongView at the time that LongView executed the note in favor of Conklin, LongView's obligation to pay
interest was set at that moment and was not contingent on any further action by either party. Id. at 427-28, 658 A.2d at 1262. Therefore, the court concluded that the interest was part of the
preexisting debt. Id.
Justice Garibaldi approvingly discussed two federal district
court opinions, which were consistent with the supreme court's
analysis, and had disapproved the rent analogy adopted by the appellate division. Id. at 428-29, 658 A.2d at 1262-63 (citing Plaza Realty Investors v. Bailey, 484 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) and Citizens
Bank of Mass. v. Parham-Woodman Medical Assocs., 874 F. Supp. 705
(E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that repayment of loan advances made
after a new partner's admission could not be viewed as analogous
to the concept of rent as new debt)).
Finally, the court concluded that it was fair to limit Conklin's
defendant class in an action to recover payments to the original

1995]

SURVEY

partners because, in executing the note, Conklin had relied only
on the original partner's credit and personal guarantee of the
note, not on subsequent partners. Id. at 429, 658 A.2d at 1263.
The court further stated that, as a lender, Conklin could have protected his interest by providing that any new partner had to sign
and personally guarantee the note and that failure to do so would
result in acceleration of the loan. Id. at 429-30, 658 A.2d at 1263.
The NewJersey Supreme Court's holding in Conklin reflects a
carefully considered interpretation of section 17 of the Uniform
Partnership Act, N.J.S.A. § 42:1-17. The court's holding promotes
the intent and purpose of the statute, which is to protect the interest of both the preexisting creditors and the incoming partners. By
holding that the obligation to pay interest is solely contract based,
the court reasonably assigns the risk to lenders by requiring that, at
the time of contracting, lenders provide for protection in the loan
agreements should a new partner join the partnership.
Elga A. Goodman

LIBEL AND SLANDER-ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE-THE ABSOLUTE
PRIVILEGE WHICH APPLIES TO COMUNICATIONS MADE BY PAR-

TICIPANTS INVOLVED IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING ExTENDS TO
STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS EMPLOYED BY THE

PARTIES TO THE ACTION OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES DURING

PRETRIAL DIscoERY-Hawkins v. Harris,141

N.J. 207, 661 A.2d

284 (1995).
On July 1, 1987, Linda Hawkins was involved in an automobile

accident. 141 N.J. at 211, 661 A.2d at 286. This accident rendered
Hawkins both physically and mentally disabled. A later automobile
accident, which occurred on July 14, 1987, worsened Hawkins' condition. Subsequently, Hawkins filed lawsuits against the two motorists involved in the separate accidents. The two lawsuits were
consolidated and ajury found in favor of Hawkins and awarded her
approximately $435,000 in damages. Id. at 211-12, 661 A.2d at 286.
A settlement between the parties later reduced this amount to
$350,000. Id. at 212, 661 A.2d at 286.
On April 10, 1991, Hawkins filed suit against attorneys, investigators, and insurance companies involved in the accident litiga-
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tion. Id. As part of the suit, Hawkins alleged that investigators,
working for various lawyers and insurance companies involved in
the accident litigation, defamed her while conducting their pretrial
investigation. Id., 661 A.2d at 287.
The defendants moved to dismiss Hawkins' complaint on the
basis that she failed to state a cause of action. Id. Hawkins made a
motion to amend her complaint. Id. Judge Yanoff, of the trial
court, dismissed Hawkins' complaint and denied her motion to
amend. Id. Subsequently, Judge Loftus granted Hawkins' motion
to amend, but later vacated the order upon learning ofJudge Yanoff's prior denial. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, ruled that
Hawkins had a right to amend her complaint, but affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of Hawkins' defamation claim against the investigators. Id. One member of the appellate division panel, however,
was troubled by allegations in Hawkins' amended complaint and
dissented from the majority's decision. Id. In particular, the dissenting judge was disturbed by Hawkins' allegations that: (1) the
investigators questioned an employee at Hawkins' health club concerning the length of time the employee was involved in an affair
with Hawkins; (2) the investigators told Hawkins' minister that she
and her husband were practicing insurance fraud; and (3) the investigators asked Hawkins' housekeeper how much Hawkins was
paying her to lie about Hawkins' situation. Id. at 212-13, 661 A.2d
at 287. The dissenting judge argued that, although attorneys are
entitled to absolute immunity for statements made during judicial
proceedings, private investigators should only receive a qualified
privilege for such communications. Id. at 213, 661 A.2d at 287.
This qualified privilege would make investigators responsible for
defamatory statements known to be false or spoken with reckless
disregard of their truthfulness or falsity. Id.
Hawkins appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court on the
basis of the dissenting judge's opinion. Id. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, however, affirmed the appellate division's dismissal of Hawkins' defamation claim against the investigators. Id. at
222, 661 A.2d at 292. The supreme court held that the absolute
privilege protecting communications by parties in a judicial proceeding extends to statements uttered by private investigators employed by the parties involved or their representatives. Id. at 211,
661 A.2d at 286.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Hern commenced the opinion by noting that a defamatory statement is not actionable if the
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statement is subject to either a qualified or an absolute privilege.
Id. at 213, 661 A.2d at 287 (quoting Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan

Co., Inc., 117 N.J. 539, 563, 569 A.2d 793 (1990) (citations omitted)). The majority recognized that communications made in the
course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings are
protected by an absolute privilege and therefore immune from liability. Id. (quoting Erickson v. Marsh &McLennan Co., Inc., 117 N.J.

539, 563, 569 A.2d 793 (1990) (citations omitted)).
Next, the majority discussed the importance of the absolute
privilege covering statements made by legislators, members of the
judiciary, attorneys, jurors, witnesses, and litigating parties. Id. at
213-14, 661 A.2d at 287-88. In order to accomplish the due administration of justice, the majority reasoned that individuals involved
in judicial proceedings must be able to speak and write without
fear of a potential defamation suit. Id. at 214, 661 A.2d at 288
(quoting Fenning v. S.G. Holding Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 110, 117, 135

A.2d 346 (citations omitted)).
Next, Justice O'Hern explained how the American doctrine of
absolute privilege derives yet differs from the English rule of immunity. Id. In particular, the majority articulated how the English
rule grants an absolute privilege to defamatory statements even
when the statements are not relevant to the subject matter of the
judicial proceedings. Id. at 214-15, 661 A.2d at 288. The majority
noted how this was different from the New Jersey rule which does
not afford protection to statements that are not relevant to the underlying judicial proceedings. Id. at 215, 661 A.2d at 288 (quoting
Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 453, 371 A.2d 380 (Law Div.
1977)).
Although this absolute privilege immunizes the speaker from a
civil defamation action, the majority emphasized that attorneys
may still be subject to professional discipline for unethical conduct.
Id. at 215, 661 A.2d at 288 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice O'Hern asserted that witnesses or parties giving false testimony
in a judicial proceeding can be prosecuted for perjury. Id. (citation omitted).
In order to determine the validity of Hawkins' defamation
claim, the majority adopted the litigation privilege test set forth by
the California Supreme Court in Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365
(1990). Id. at 215-16, 661 A.2d at 289. Justice O'Hern stated that
under this test, an absolute privilege protects communications that
are: (1) made in quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings; (2) made
by litigants or participants authorized by law; (3) made to accom-

480

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:467

plish the objectives of the litigation; and (4) connected or logically
related to the action. Id. at 216, 661 A.2d at 289 (quoting Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d at 369). Since the most difficult issue in Hawkins' case involved whether the investigators could be considered
participants authorized by law, the majority decided to parse this
question last. Id.
Evaluating the first element of the test, Justice O'Hern determined that the investigators conducted their pretrial discussions in
the course of Hawkins' personal injury litigation. Id. at 217, 661
A.2d at 290. The majority noted that the litigation privilege is not
confined to remarks made in a courtroom during trial but encompasses all communications which are connected with ajudicial proceeding. Id. at 216, 661 A.2d at 289 (quoting Ruberton v. Gabage,
280 N.J. Super. 125, 133, 654 A.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1995)). In particular, Justice O'Hern noted how the privilege extends to conversations during settlement negotiations, private litigation-related
conferences with attorneys, and preliminary communications between prospective witnesses and attorneys that are in some way
connected to a contemplated or pending action. Id. (citations
omitted). The majority supported its finding by emphasizing the
importance of affording litigants and witnesses the unqualified opportunity to seek the truth of the situation without fearing recrimination. Id. at 216-17, 661 A.2d at 289-90.
As for the third element of the test, Justice O'Hern determined that the investigations were conducted in the course of
Hawkins' accident litigation and consequently, sought to accomplish the objectives of the litigation. Id. at 218, 661 A.2d at 290.
The majority emphasized that pretrial investigations are necessary
to achieve the objectives of litigation because they are essential to
the truth-finding process. Id. at 217, 661 A.2d at 290 (citations
omitted). As additional support, Justice O'Hern noted the Devlin
court's implicit recognition that communications made by a private investigator during the course of a judicial proceeding would
be protected by the absolute privilege. Id. at 217-18, 661 A.2d at
290 (citing Devlin, 147 N.J. Super. at 458, 371 A.2d at 380).
As to the fourth element of the test, the majority concluded
that the investigators' alleged defamatory statements regarding insurance fraud and their subornation of a witness were related to
the course of Hawkins' litigation proceedings. Id. at 219, 661 A.2d
at 290. Justice O'Hern explained that the requisite relation is not a
technically legal relevancy standard but instead a general frame of
reference to the subject matter of the proceeding. Id. at 218, 661
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A.2d at 290 (quotation omitted). The majority added that this issue of relatedness could not be resolved by inquiring into the
morals, motives, values, and ethics of the investigators. Id.
By contrast, Justice O'Hern was not certain about the relevance of the investigators' accusations concerning Hawkins' infidelity. Id. at 219. The majority, however, noting that the trial
judge may not have considered the relevance of the investigators'
allegations, stated that this issue was not before the court on appeal. Id. at 222, 661 A.2d at 292.
Finally, the majority tackled the critical issue of whether the
investigators were participants authorized by law. Id. at 219, 661
A.2d at 290. Justice O'Hern noted that the absolute privilege protects attorneys and other representatives employed to assist a party
in litigation. Id., 661 A.2d at 291 (quoting Petty v. GeneralAccident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966)).
Moreover, the majority recognized the protection afforded to
counsel's agents and employees when acting at counsel's request.
Id. (citing Youmans v. Smith, 153 N.Y. 214, 47 N.E. 265, 267 (1897)).
Justice O'Hern then cited Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating
Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 68 N.J. Super. 85, 92, 172 A.2d 22
(App. Div. 1961), where it was determined that communications
made by an engineering consultant working for a party in a pending lawsuit were immunized by the litigation privilege. Id.
Justice O'Hern cited Leavitt v. Bickerton, 855 F.Supp. 455 (D.
Mass. 1994), as the nearest case on point. Id. Justice O'Hern
noted that the Leavitt court held that an attorney's private investigator was immune from liability for suggesting to the opposing
party's former employers that the opposing party had abused alcohol during her pregnancy. Id. at 219-20, 661 A.2d at 291. The majority agreed with the Leavitt court's holding, which determined
that the investigator was involved in activity that would be protected if conducted by an attorney. Id. at 220, 661 A.2d at 291. The
court concurred that the private investigator should be afforded
the absolute privilege while acting as counsel's agent. Id. The majority further noted that just as the legislative privilege applies to
legislators' aides, the litigation privilege should cover statements
made by an attorneys' aide during the course of a judicial proceeding. Id. at 220, 661 A.2d at 291 (citing Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 621, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2624-25, 33 L.Ed.2d 583, 600 (1972)).
In conclusion, the majority extended the absolute privilege to
the relevant communications of the private investigators which
were made during the pretrial discovery process. Id. at 221, 661
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A.2d at 292. Recognizing that absolute privileges are limited to situations where protection against abuse of such privilege exists, Justice O'Hern listed the following safeguards: (1) the court's power
to sanction parties for abusing the discovery process; (2) the State
licensing procedures which will govern some private investigators;
and (3) the attorney's professional responsibility for the conduct of
his aides. Id. at 221, 661 A.2d at 291-92 (quotations and citations
omitted). Justice O'Hern emphasized that, as in England 600 years
ago, this absolute privilege is imperative to an effective judicial system because it encourages complete and truthful testimony, promotes zealous advocacy, gives finality to judgments, and avoids the
problem of unending litigation. Id. at 222, 661 A.2d at 292 (quotations omitted). Justice O'Hern, however, warned that this privilege
is not a license to defame and reiterated that communications
must be related to the judicial proceeding in order to be protected.
Id.
In a sharp dissent, Justice Handler strongly disagreed with the
majority's extension of the absolute privilege to statements made
by private investigators while in the course of their investigations.
Id. at 222-23, 661 A.2d at 292 (Handler, J., dissenting). Instead, the
dissent preferred to limit private investigators to a qualified privilege for defamatory statements, made during investigations but not
directly part of a judicial proceeding. Id. at 223, 661 A.2d at 292
(Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler agreed with the majority that public policy,
which encourages free communication in order to administer justice, justifies an absolute privilege for persons involved or participating in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Id., 661 A.2d at
292-93. The Justice, however, posited that private investigators are
neither parties, jurors, judges, nor attorneys and that their investigations, although related to litigation, are not always a constituent
element ofjudicial proceedings. Id. at 224, 661 A.2d at 293 (Handler, J., dissenting). As for cases in which an investigator could
potentially be a witness, Justice Handler postulated that a lack of
immunity would unlikely prevent the investigator from testifying or
cause the investigator to distort testimony. Id. Although Justice
Handler recognized that an investigator may receive the absolute
privilege if he becomes a witness, the dissent argued that statements made in uncontrolled, unstructured, and informal discovery
situations should not be protected by absolute immunity. Id.
Next, Justice Handler attacked the majority's assertion that an
investigator, employed by an attorney, is a representative of the at-
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torney, and thus, protected by an absolute privilege. Id. at 225, 661
A.2d at 294 (Handler, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that
Hawkins' case was distinguishable from Middlesex Concrete Products
and Excavating Corporation because Hawkins' case involved investigators' statements to third parties instead of communications during a judicial proceeding between an expert witness and an
attorney. Id. at 226, 661 A.2d at 294 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover, Justice Handler noted that the
Petty court extended the absolute privilege to the insurers in the
case because they were interested and authorized participants who
were engaged in the settlement of legal claims. Id. at 227, 661 A.2d
at 295 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The dissent disapproved of the Leavitt court's extension of the
absolute privilege to private investigators. Id. at 227, 661 A.2d at
295 (Handler,J., dissenting). The justice again argued that a qualified privilege would afford sufficient protection to such investigatory statements without infringing on the investigator's ability to
successfully investigate. Id. Additionally, the dissent disagreed with
the Leavitt court's holding that an investigator's agency relationship with an attorney was a sufficient basis to grant absolute immunity to an investigator during the course of an investigation. Id. at
227-28, 661 A.2d at 295 (Handler, J., dissenting). Even though an
agency relationship could make an attorney vicariously liable for
the defamatory conduct of his agents, the justice favored a qualified privilege because it would promote the increased supervision
of investigators by counsel and could inspire investigators themselves to act more fairly and responsibly. Id. at 228, 661 A.2d at 295
(Handler, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler, however, admitted that, when an investigator
becomes a witness in ajudicial proceeding, public policy may favor
an absolute privilege. Id. The dissent distinguished this situation
from those in which investigators, without fear of repercussion,
plunge into the community and defame people in the hope of discovering witnesses and testimony to support their client's case. Id.
at 228-29, 661 A.2d at 295 (Handler, J., dissenting). Because the
absolute privilege would not facilitate the truth finding process,
but instead would encourage insinuation, innuendo, and insult,
the justice disagreed with the extension of the absolute privilege in
these instances. Id. at 229, 661 A.2d at 295-96 (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
Finally, Justice Handler remarked that, while attorneys are
subject to the Rules ofProfessionalConduct for defamatory conduct, a
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private investigator's "informal discovery" is not governed by such a
safeguard. Id. at 229, 661 A.2d at 296 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The dissent argued that the absolute privilege when combined with
the absence of a safeguard becomes a license to defame. Id. at 230,
661 A.2d at 296 (Handler,J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Justice
reiterated that giving immunity to investigators who are not involved in judicial proceedings fails to achieve the sole purpose of
the absolute privilege, the encouragement and promotion of the
truth. Id.
The absolute privilege afforded to persons involved in judicial
proceedings makes perfect sense because it facilitates the truthfinding process. Since judges, attorneys, jurors, witnesses, and litigating parties cannot be civilly liable for communications made in
such situations, these individuals will not be reluctant to reveal all
relevant information in a particular case. As the dissent suggests,
however, such reluctance is not much of a concern with private
investigators hired to uncover facts. Therefore, the absolute privilege should not be extended to private investigators who utter defamatory statements while conducting an investigation that is not
an actual part of a judicial proceeding.
As the dissent noted, unless the investigator becomes a witness
in the case, statements made during these pretrial discovery investigations are not subject to the judicial safeguards which govern participating parties. Consequently, the majority's standard does little
to prevent an investigator from spreading harmful, untrue rumors
throughout a community. The dissent soundly opined that communications made in such investigations should be subject to a
qualified privilege whereby the speaker will be responsible for defamatory language when he knows that it is false or speaks in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Certainly, this requirement will
not hinder the work of upstanding, professional investigators.
PeterJ Kozlowski
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CIVIL PROCEDURE-ENTIRE

CONTRovESY DOCTRINE-UNDER

NEW JERSEY'S ENTIr E CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE,

NEW

JERSEY

COURTS ARE NOT OBLIGED TO HEAR CLAIMS AGAINST PARTIES
THAT COULD HAVE BEEN JOINED WITH SIMILAR CLAIMS BY THE

SAME PLAINTIFF AGAINST OTHER PARTIES IN ANOTHER STATEMortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 142 N.J.
336, 662 A.2d 536 (1995).
From May 1990 to February 1991, Mortgagelinq Corporation
("Mortgagelinq"), a New Jersey/Pennsylvania-based mortgage
lender, was induced to enter into twenty-four allegedly fraudulent
mortgage transactions. Id. at 339, 662 A.2d at 538. The perpetrators principally responsible for the alleged fraud were based in
Pennsylvania (the "Pennsylvania defendants"). Allegedly, the
Pennsylvania defendants purchased property at its fair market
value, and then fraudulently resold it that same day to another
Pennsylvania defendant at a significantly higher price.
In each of these transactions, Mortgagelinq provided mortgage financing to the Pennsylvania defendants based upon the increased purchase price of the second sale. As a result, the
Pennsylvania defendants were able to pocket the difference between the first and second purchase prices. Eventually the scam
collapsed, leaving Mortgagelinq with inadequate collateral. Id. at
340, 662 A.2d at 538.
On March 13, 1991, Mortgagelinq filed suit against the Pennsylvania defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("Mortgagelinq I"). Id. The defendants
included a mortgage broker and its employees, a principal, an appraiser, a person who managed the corporate defendants' affairs,
the attorneys who accepted payment in relation to the transactions,
a real estate agency and its employees, an insurance agency and it
employees, and an individual who purportedly examined the alleged fraudulent appraisals. Id.
On February 13, 1992, Mortgagelinq and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), an assignee of a portion of the alleged fraudulent loans (together the "plaintiffs") filed
suit in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Camden
County ("Mortgagelinq II"), against the alleged accessories to the
fraud: three title insurance companies, a title agency, and three
alleged employees of either the title agency or the title insurance
companies (the "New Jersey defendants"). Id. The allegations
raised in the Mortgagelinq II complaint involved the same transac-
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tions at issue in the Mortgagelinq I complaint. Id. One day later,
the Pennsylvania court granted Freddie Mac's January 31, 1992,
motion to intervene as a plaintiff in Mortgagelinq I. Id.
Subsequent to the filing of the complaint in Mortgagelinq II,
some of the Pennsylvania defendants sought to join the Mortgagelinq II defendants in the Mortgagelinq I proceeding. Id. The
Pennsylvania court refused to grant this request. Id. at 341, 662
A.2d at 538.
Asserting that Mortgagelinq and Freddie Mac had intentionally delayed the filing of Mortgagelinq II until after the allowable
period forjoinder had expired in the Pennsylvania action, some of
the Mortgagelinq II defendants moved to dismiss the New Jersey
complaint against them on the basis of NewJersey's entire controversy doctrine. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted the
New Jersey defendants' motion and dismissed the Mortgagelinq II
complaint with prejudice. Id., 662 A.2d at 539. The Law Division
concluded that because the subject matter in both suits was identical, because the New Jersey defendants were subject to in personam jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania federal court, and because
the plaintiffs had intentionally chose to bifurcate their claims despite these facts, the entire controversy doctrine should operate as
a bar to the plaintiffs' New Jersey action. Id. (citations omitted).
Due to the fact that Mortgagelinq I had been concluded by
default judgments or settlements against the majority of the Pennsylvania defendants, the plaintiffs filed a separate suit on September 11, 1992, against the NewJersey defendants in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("Mortgagelinq III").
Id. at 342, 662 A.2d at 539. Citing the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution, the New Jersey defendants
moved to dismiss the Mortgagelinq III complaint. Id. While noting that the New Jersey ruling in Mortgagelinq II might preclude
the Mortgagelinq III complaint, the Pennsylvania court denied the
New Jersey defendants' motion as the New Jersey ruling was still
subject to appeal. Id.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
affirmed the decision of the Law Division in Mortgagelinq II. Id.
(citing Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 275
NJ. Super. 79, 645 A.2d 787 (App. Div. 1994)). The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' petition for certification. Id.
(citing Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 138
N.J. 270, 649 A.2d 1290 (1994)).
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Writing for the majority, Justice O'Hern affirmed the Appellate Division's decision with regard to the entire controversy doctrine, barring the plaintiffs' pursuit of legal action in New Jersey
against the NewJersey defendants. Id. at 338, 348, 662 A.2d at 537,
542. The majority, however, disagreed with the Appellate Division's decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaints with prejudice.
Id. at 348, 662 A.2d at 542. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the Appellate Division's ruling regarding the prejudicial aspect of the dismissal. Id.
Justice O'Hern began the court's opinion by examining the
evolution of New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. Id. at 342,
662 A.2d at 539. The justice explained that the entire controversy
doctrine had originally been invoked only as a claimjoinder rule,
precluding the prosecution of claims between parties that the
court could have joined in previous proceedings between the parties. Id. at 342-43, 662 A.2d at 539 (citation omitted). Justice
O'Hern remarked that, with the court's decision in Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989) the application
of the entire controversy doctrine was expanded to include partyjoinder as well as claimjoinder. Id. at 343, 662 A.2d at 539-40.
As a result of the Cogdell holding, the majority explained, a
mandatory party and claim joinder rule was promulgated by the
court. Id., 662 A.2d at 540 (citing N.J. Cirv. PRAc. R. 4:30A). Examining the rule and its adoption of mandatory compliance with the
entire controversy doctrine, Justice O'Hern indicated that the entire controversy doctrine would clearly preclude prosecution of
Mortgagelinq II, had both it and Mortgagelinq I been filed successively in New Jersey courts. Id. While acknowledging that this was
not the issue before the court, Justice O'Hern articulated that the
focus of the court's inquiry was whether the non-joinder of parties
in a related out-of-state action should have the same preclusive effect in NewJersey. Id. If so, the justice observed, the court had to
determine what effect the preclusion should have in otherjurisdictions. Id.
In answering the threshold issue, Justice O'Hern first noted
that the entire controversy doctrine has been applied to preclude
actions brought in New Jersey based upon claims which had been
omitted from previous actions in other jurisdictions. Id. (citation
omitted). Next, the justice observed that the doctrine had been
invoked to preclude actions from being brought against parties
who were omitted from a previous in-state federal court proceeding. Id. at 344, 662 A.2d at 540 (citation omitted).
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Citing these applications of the doctrine as authority, the majority concluded that the goals of New Jersey's entire controversy
doctrine would be served by precluding the plaintiffs from prosecuting the Mortgagelinq II action against parties that could have
been joined in the Mortgagelinq I proceeding. Id. To further support this rationale, the court submitted that had the Pennsylvania
court been presented with a timely action to join the omitted parties, the Pennsylvania court would most likely have joined the
claims. Id.
Underscoring that the principles underlying the entire controversy doctrine are fairness and judicial economy, Justice O'Hern
recognized that what New Jersey may find fair and efficient, Pennsylvania may not. Id. at 344-45, 662 A.2d at 540-41. Accordingly,
the justice admonished that if Pennsylvania courts do not have similar partyjoinder rules, New Jersey should not foist its entire controversy doctrine upon attorneys practicing in that jurisdiction. Id.
at 345, 662 A.2d at 541. Conversely, Justice O'Hern exalted, New
Jersey courts should not be required to have another jurisdiction's
standards foisted upon them. Id. Thus, though Pennsylvania federal courts may allow intentional bifurcation of parties, the justice
explained, NewJersey courts need not follow Pennsylvania's rationale. Id. Justice O'Hern surmised that a careful balance must be
struck among the interests of justice and the interests of the two
competing jurisdictions. Id.
In order to strike this balance and determine what effect the
majority's judgement should have on other jurisdictions, Justice
O'Hern acknowledged that the binding effect of ajudgment is generally determined by the law of the rendering jurisdiction. Id. at
346, 662 A.2d at 541 (citations omitted). Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the justice observed, dismissals for failure to
comply with a rule are deemed to be an adjudication on the merits
unless otherwise specified. Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, the
majority explained, the NewJersey Rules declare such dismissals to
be without prejudice unless otherwise specified. Id. (citation
omitted).
While declaring that a dismissal for failure to comply with the
entire controversy doctrine precludes subsequent adjudications
from being brought in New Jersey, the majority found that such a
dismissal is similar to a threshold adjudication rather than an adjudication on the merits. Id. at 347, 662 A.2d at 542. Thus, the court
surmised that such a dismissal should not be applied through the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to act as a bar to subsequent adjudica-
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tions in other jurisdictions. Id. Such jurisdictions, Justice O'Hern
opined, are free to debate the rationale and application of the entire controversy doctrine in theirjudicial systems. Id. at 347-48, 662
A.2d at 542.
Justice Pollock authored a sharply critical dissent in which Justice Stein joined. Id. at 348, 662 A.2d at 542 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice began by recognizing that the issue before the
court was whether the plaintiffs' recovery of ajudgment against the
Pennsylvania defendants in federal court should act as a bar to the
plaintiffs suing the New Jersey defendants in New Jersey state
courts. Id. at 349, 662 A.2d at 543 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Restating the majority's recognition that the preclusive result of a judgment should be determined by the law of the rendering
jurisdiction, Justice Pollock concluded that because federal law
would not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing an action against
the New Jersey defendants in federal court, New Jersey should not
prevent the plaintiffs from seeking redress in its state courts. Id. at
349-50, 662 A.2d at 543 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the justice explained that the majority should have
applied the relevant federal law, not New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. Id. at 353, 662 A.2d at 544 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Justice Pollock buttressed his opinion by noting the sharp criticism New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine has received from
the legal community, both locally and abroad. Id. at 350-51, 662
A.2d at 543-44 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice
Pollock further lamented that the majority's opinion had lost sight
of the concept of judicial fairness that underlies the entire controversy doctrine. Id. at 353, 662 A.2d at 544-45 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The justice stressed that it was manifestly
unfair to invoke the entire controversy doctrine to bar wrongfully
defrauded plaintiffs from seeking redress against wrongdoers in
New Jersey state courts, simply because their attorneys failed to follow the New Jersey Rules of Practice in a Pennsylvania federal
court. Id. at 354-55, 662 A.2d at 545-46 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
With its decision in Mortgagelinq, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has opened a pandora's box. Though claiming that New
Jersey's entire controversy doctrine rests upon notions of fairness
and judicial economy, the court's decision appears to be sending a
different message. As reflected by Justice Pollock, it is manifestly
unfair to preclude wrongfully defrauded plaintiffs from seekingjustice in New Jersey simply because their attorneys failed to follow
the New Jersey Rules of Practice in a Pennsylvania federal court.

490

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:467

While the court asserts that it did not intend to do so, the Mortgagelinq decision exports the coverage of the entire controversy doctrine across state lines. As a result, lawyers who maintain actions in
the other forty-nine states need be aware of New Jersey's doctrine.
JonathanNeal Marcus

FAMILY LAW-NAMEs-A PRESUMPTION EXISTS IN FAVOR OF
SURNAME

CHOSEN FOR A CHILD BY THE CHILD'S CUSTODIAL

THE

PAR-

ENT-Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120, 657 A.2d 856 (1995).
On July 4, 1991, Karen Deremer, the defendant, gave birth to
a son, Scott Thomas Deremer. 140 N.J. 120, 123, 657 A.2d 856, 858
(1995). Scott's father, Alan Gubernat, the plaintiff, initially questioned his paternity and was neither present for the birth of the
child nor named on the birth certificate. In February 1992, blood
tests confirmed that Mr. Gubernat was the child's father. At that
time, Mr. Gubernat admitted paternity and contacted Ms. Deremer
in order to initiate a relationship with the child.
Mr. Gubernat subsequently brought an action seeking joint
custody, joint consultation on major decisions, greater visitation,
and a change of the child's surname from Deremer to Gubernat.
Id. at 123-24, 657 A.2d at 858. The trial court granted joint custody, greater visitation privileges, and ordered that the child's surname be changed to Gubernat. Id. at 125, 657 A.2d at 859.
Specifically, the trial court held that a father has a right to have
progeny and to have someone carry on the father's name. Id. The
trial court explained that this right is not relevant where a father is
merely seeking to protect his ego or to maintain his perceived male
privileges, but is relevant where it is asserted in recognition of a
"father's interest in maintaining his relationship with his child for
their mutual benefit." Id. The trial court concluded that if the
child retained his mother's surname, it might contribute to his estrangement from his father.
Ms. Deremer appealed the trial court's decision regarding the
surname. Id. The Appellate Division, however, remanded the case
and directed the trial court to clarify the conclusions of law and
findings of facts. Id. In particular, the Appellate Division sought
additional information regarding how the child's best interests
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would be served by changing his surname to Gubernat. Id. at 12526, 657 A.2d at 859. The trial court supplemented its prior decision and concluded that the child's best interests would be served
by a change of surname because retaining the mother's surname
may represent to the child a rejection by his father. Id. at 126, 657
A.2d at 859.
The Appellate Division affirmed the decision of the trial court
in an unreported opinion. Id. The Appellate Division reasoned
that the use of the paternal name was in the child's best interests
because his paternal identity and bond with his father were important in fortifying the relationship between the child and his father.
Id. Ms. Deremer petitioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey for
certification. Id.
The supreme court granted certification and reversed the decisions of the lower courts. Id. at 147, 657 A.2d at 870. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stein, the supreme court held that
the surname selected by a custodial parent is presumed to be consistent with the best interests of the child. Id. at 123, 657 A.2d at
858. The court further held that the presumption is rebuttable by
evidence that the child's best interests would be better served by a
different surname. Id.
Justice Stein began the court's analysis with an historical survey of the use of surnames. Id. at 126-27, 657 A.2d at 859. The
Anglo-Saxon tradition of surnames, the court reported, began with
the Norman Conquest of 1066. Id. (citing Yvonne M. Cherena
Pacheco, Latino Surnames: Formal and Informal Forces in the United
States Affecting the Retention and Use of the Maternal Surname, 18 T.
Marshall L. Rev. 1, 5 (1992)). The Norman influence, the court
continued, resulted in the use of surnames for two reasons: (1)
non-English names so increased in popularity that a second name
was necessary to avoid confusion and misunderstandings; and (2)
the Normans introduced the feudal land system, as well as the utilization of primogeniture as a scheme of inheritance, which eventually necessitated the use of surnames. Id. at 127, 657 A.2d at 859-60
(citations omitted).
The court observed that surnames were neither automatically
nor traditionally passed from father to child. Id. at 128, 657 A.2d at
860 (citation omitted). These original surnames, the court commented, came from a variety of sources, such as by accident, taste,
caprice, occupation, places of habitation, from a particular attribute or characteristic, as well as through kinship. Id. at 127-28, 657
A.2d at 860 (citations omitted).
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It was not until the fourteenth century, the court noted, that
the use of the paternal surname became widespread. Id. at 129,
657 A.2d at 861 (citation omitted). Justice Stein explained that this
occurred because the medieval property structure granted the husband all rights of management and ownership in all marital property and because, quite often, property could not be inherited
unless the heir retained the surname associated with that property.
Id. at 129-30, 657 A.2d at 861 (citations omitted).
In the early sixteenth century, Justice Stein continued, the use
of paternal surnames was further institutionalized with the advent
of King Henry VIII's Parish Registry System. Id. at 130, 657 A.2d at
861 (citation omitted). The court explained that this system called
for each parish to keep records of the births, marriages, and deaths
of its inhabitants. Id. This system, the court concluded, encouraged families to use one surname, the father's, for purposes of
record-keeping. Id. (quoting Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz & Gloria
Jeanne Stillson MacDonnell, Married Women's Surnames, 5 Conn. L.
Rev. 598, 600 (1973)). Eventually, the court remarked, King Henry
VIII required that all children born to married persons be recorded under the father's surname. Id. at 131, 657 A.2d at 862
(quoting Cynthia Blevins Doll, Note, HarmonizingFilialand Parental
Rights in Names: Progress,Pitfalls and ConstitutionalProblems, 35 How.
L.J. 227, 229 (1992)).
Justice Stein contrasted that requirement with the traditions
surrounding children born to unmarried parents. Id. Such children, Justice Stein explained, were deemed "the son of no one, or
. . . the son of the people." Id. (quoting D.R.S. v. RS.H., 412
N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). The law did not recognize a mother or a father for these children, the court continued,
and they had no legal rights, including the right to inherit property. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, the need to utilize the
paternal surname was greatly diminished and at some point later in
the child's life the community, not custom, provided the child with
a surname. Id. (quotation omitted).
The court next surveyed the development of the use of paternal surnames in the United States. Id. at 132, 657 A.2d at 862. The
colonists brought this tradition with them, the court explained,
and it continued as a result of the social forces of the time, in particular the inferior legal status of women. Id. The court quoted
from a seventeenth century document on women's rights to emphasize the inferior social and familial status of women; for example, upon marriage a woman's new self was deemed to be her
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superior, her master, her husband. Id. at 132, 657 A.2d at 862-63
(quotation omitted). The colonial woman, Justice Stein observed,
had no legal rights and was considered the property of her father
and, upon marriage, the property of her husband. Id. at 132, 657
A.2d at 863 (quotation omitted).
The court explained that other factors, aside from the inferior
status of women, expanded the tradition of utilizing the paternal
surname. Id. at 133, 657 A.2d at 863. Some authorities, the court
observed, suggest that giving a child the paternal surname signified
the father's role as head of the family. Id. (quotation omitted). In
support of that conclusion, the court quoted one colonial father's
statement concerning the family: "I look upon my family as a patriarchal sovereignty in which I am myself both king and priest." Id.
(quotation omitted). The court listed additional factors increasing
the use of paternal surnames, including the retention of the system
of primogeniture and the practice of entail. Id.
Justice Stein continued this historical survey and observed that
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw some limited changes
in the legal and social status of women. Id. at 133-34, 657 A.2d at
863-67. Justice Stein noted that women actively participated in the
American Revolution, forming patriotic groups, campaigning
against British practices, producing propaganda, and caring for
and fighting alongside men. Id. at 134, 657 A.2d at 863. The Married Women's Property Act, Justice Stein further observed, was
passed in England and in most states in the second half of the nineteenth century. Id. at 134, 657 A.2d at 864.
The court observed that the nineteenth century also saw a
change in the treatment of illegitimate children. Id. The court
explained that mothers were awarded custody of those formerly
known as the sons and daughters of nobody, and this union was
recognized as a legal family. Id. (citing Secretary of Commonwealth v.
City Clerk of Lowell, 366 N.E.2d 717, 726 (Mass. 1977)). The legislation which directed this, the court continued, also provided that
such children would take the mother's surname. Id. at 135, 657
A.2d at 864 (citations omitted). The court emphasized that the
statute resulted in discriminatory treatment of children based
upon birth status and, while the intention was not to extend any
particular right or privilege to women, the statute also underscored
the traditional view that the mother had greater rights vis-a-vis the
child than did the father. Id. at 135-36, 657 A.2d at 864-65 (quotation omitted).
Justice Stein stated that American women have continued to
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confront gender-based obstacles in the twentieth century. Id. at
136, 657 A.2d at 865. The notion that "husband and wife are one,
the one [being] the husband," Justice Stein observed, hampered
women's ability to achieve financial and legal independence. Id.
(quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). This inferiority, Justice Stein recounted, provided
further support for the strict use of paternal surnames. Id. For
example, Justice Stein explained, this country's courts have articulated the right of the father to give his surname to his children,
defining it as a natural right, a customary right, an absolute right,
and a commendable and natural desire. Id. (citations omitted).
In contrast, the court maintained that the twentieth century
has also produced dynamic social change, particularly in the arena
of marital and parental equality. Id. at 137, 657 A.2d at 865 (quotation omitted). The court asserted that the laws of New Jersey, and
throughout the nation, evidence the principle of gender-neutrality
and attempt to remedy formerly disparate treatment of mothers
and fathers in their rights and responsibilities as parents. Id. (quoting KK. v. G., 219 N.J. Super. 334, 337, 530 A.2d 361 (Ch. Div.
1987)).
The court referred to the adoption of the New Jersey Parentage Act, which governs paternity proceedings and was intended to
ensure equal rights for mothers, fathers, and children, regardless
of marital status. Id. at 137-38, 657 A.2d at 865-66 (citing NJ.S.A.
9:17-38 et seq.). Among the results of this Act, the court explained,
was an elimination of the differences between children born to
married parents and children born to unmarried parents, and a
direction that no parent is to be preferred over the other solely
because of his or her role as father or mother. Id. at 138, 657 A.2d
at 866 (quoting In re Baby M, 109 NJ. 396, 453, 537 A.2d 1227
(1988)). With regard to custody, Justice Stein continued, the principles of gender equality were again acknowledged in 1990 when
the legislature significantly amended the law, directing that
mothers and fathers have equal rights in all custody proceedings.

Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2-4).
The legislature has eliminated gender bias with regard to marital and parental rights, the court asserted, and these presumptions
and biases have been replaced with a test which focuses on the
child's welfare and happiness. Id. at 139, 657 A.2d at 866. The best
interests of the child standard, the court noted, is applied in most
legal proceedings involving children, including "custody, adoption,
abuse and neglect, guardianship, termination of parental rights,
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and even disposition following juvenile court proceedings." Id.
(quoting Beverly S. Seng, Like Father, Like Child: The Rights of Parents in Their Children'sSurnames, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1303, 1313-14 (1984)
(footnote omitted)).
The court found, therefore, that the best interests of the child
standard is the appropriate standard to apply in determining a
child's surname. Id. The court rejected the presumption of many
courts that the child's best interests are served by using the father's
surname. Id. at 14041, 657 A.2d at 867. The court challenged the
theory that the paternal surname is an indispensable element of
the father-child relationship and concluded that the best interests
of the child standard must be applied free of these gender-based
notions. Id. at 141, 657 A.2d at 867.
The court articulated a variety of factors to assist in applying
the best interests of the child standard, including: the time the
child has used the surname; the association of the child with a family unit; the potential that a child may experience anxiety, discomfort, or embarrassment due to a different surname than the
custodial parent; and, assuming a certain level of maturity, the
preferences the child might express. Id. at 141, 657 A.2d at 867-68
(citations omitted). The court acknowledged that many courts
have had difficulty applying such factors, resulting in inconsistency
and unpredictability.
Id. at 142, 657 A.2d 868 (quotation
omitted).
Justice Stein addressed the problem of inconsistent results and
considered declaring an presumption in support of the surname
selected by a child's custodial parent. Id. This presumption, Justice Stein explained, is not new and is derived from the basic family
law principle that the custodial parent receives broad responsibility
in making decisions concerning the child and is presumed to act in
the best interests of the child in making those decisions. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Stein noted that many commentators recommend the application of this presumption, and many courts and
legislatures have already adopted it. Id. at 142-44, 657 A.2d at 86869 (citations omitted).
The court consequently declared a strong presumption favoring the surname chosen by a child's custodial parent. Id. at 145,
657 A.2d at 869. The court cautioned, however, that many circumstances exist which could rebut this presumption. Id. at 144, 657
A.2d at 869. For example, the court instructed, where a child has
used the non-custodial surname for some period of time, is commonly known by that surname, has expressed comfort with the idea
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of keeping that surname, and is in regular contact with the noncustodial parent, the child's best interests might not be served by
changing the surname. Id. at 144-45, 657 A.2d at 869. The presumption, the court concluded, is accorded substantial weight, but
is rebuttable if the non-custodial parent can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the custodial parent's surname is
not in the child's best interests. Id. at 145, 657 A.2d at 869. The
court reasoned that this rebuttable presumption serves two ends: it
safeguards a custodial parent's right to make decisions in the
child's best interest while also permitting judicial intervention
when that decision is not in the child's best interests. Id.
The court acknowledged that by allowing many children to
bear a surname different from their fathers, this presumption may
be perceived as conflicting with a longstanding, customary expectation that a child will bear the surname of his or her father and
create concerns over the child's potential discomfort. Id. The
court, however, affirmed its belief in society's tolerance and acceptance of non-traditional surnames, a tolerance which the court expects will grow as the use of non-paternal surnames decreases and
the reasons for such choices become better understood. Id. at 145,
657 A.2d at 869-70. The court accepted that this process of understanding may be gradual, but nevertheless, maintained that the
presumption is in the child's best interests and is reflective of the
significant changes in women's rights. Id. at 145-46, 657 A.2d at
870.
Finally, the court applied the best interests standard and the
presumption in favor of the custodial parent's choice of surname
to the case at bar. Id. at 146, 657 A.2d at 870. The court noted that
a surname does not define a person as a parent, but rather his or
her willingness to provide for the child's needs. Id. The court
recognized that both Ms. Deremer and Mr. Gubernat are capable
of discharging their parental responsibilities. Id. The court also
expressed confidence in both Ms. Deremer's and Mr. Gubernat's
ability to be supportive and loving parents. Id.
The court considered that Ms. Deremer was exercising complete physical custody of the child when she named him and, therefore, she is presumed to have been acting in the child's best
interests in selecting that name. Id. The court explained that Mr.
Gubernat had not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in the child's surname would be in his best
interests. Id. The court described the evidence offered by Mr.
Gubernat, the essence of which was his need for his son to know
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that he always will have a father. Id. The court explained, however, that rather than a surname, fatherhood is better represented
by a parent's support, devotion, and commitment. Id. The court
also noted that no evidence had been produced to establish that
the use of the paternal surname is necessary to maintain the fatherchild relationship and, the court suggested, such a notion is based
upon the very gender bias sought to be eliminated. Id. at 147, 657
A.2d at 870.
Because the evidence did not establish that the use of Ms. Deremer's surname would be contrary to the child's best interests, or
that the use of Mr. Gubernat's surname would better serve those
interests, the court reversed the decisions of the lower courts and
ruled that the child would retain the surname selected by his custodial parent, his mother. Id.
This decision may be criticized for its break with tradition and
for a perceived weakening of a father's parental rights. The court's
decision, however, not only comports with principles of genderneutrality and equality in the law, but also puts the focus of the
issue where it belongs, on the child and the child's best interests.
Moreover, this decision follows the tradition of permitting the
custodial parent to make decisions for his or her child and the
long-standing presumption that those decisions are in the child's
best interests. In an era where many adults' surnames no longer
follow the traditional, patriarchal rule, it seems appropriate for the
court to defeat the notion that every father has a right to have
every child bear his surname simply because of his gender and
without regard to his presence or absence in the child's life.
In this case, it is an incomprehensible tragedy that, on the
Sunday following the court's decision, Mother's Day, Mr. Gubernat
took the life of his three-and-a-half-year-old son and then took his
own life. He left behind no explanation for his actions.
Susan A. Munson
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-EisRE CoNTRovERsY DocTRINE-JOINDER OF PARTIES REQUIREMENT OF THE ENTIRE CON-

TRovERsY DOCTRINE APPLIES TO A CLIENT'S LEGAL MALPRACTICE

CLAIM AGAINST AN ATrORNEY, EVEN WHEN THE ATTORNEY Is
CURRENTLY

REPRESENTING

THE

CLIENT

IN THE

UNDERLYING

Circle Chevrolet Co. v. Giordano, Halleran &
Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280, 662 A.2d 509 (1995).

TRANSACTION-

In 1972, plaintiff Circle Chevrolet Company ("Circle"), a privately-owned corporation that maintains a car dealership located
on property owned by Masward II in Shrewsbury, New Jersey, entered into a lease with Masward II for a period of thirty years and
retained defendant law firm Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla (GH &
C) to prepare the necessary documents. 142 N.J. at 285, 662 A.2d
at 511. Twelve years after the commencement of the lease, in
March of 1985, Circle, again represented by defendant GH & C,
and Masward II, represented by Gaughram & Steib (Gaughram),
began negotiations for the first rent increase. Id. at 286, 662 A.2d at
511. Although the rental lease agreement explicitly contained a
clause that provided for periodic rent increases based on a percentage of increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Circle unknowingly agreed to pay a rent fixed by a formula, devised by
Gaughram, that calculated the modification utilizing the actual increase in the CPI from February of 1973 to February of 1983. Id. at
285-86, 662 A.2d at 511.
After receiving a letter from Gaughram containing the proposed rent increase, defendant GH & C forwarded it to Circle for
its inspection and approval. Id. at 286, 662 A.2d at 511. Before
accepting the increased amount, however, Circle contacted the accounting firm of Petrics, Meskin, Nassaur & Dambach (Petrics),
asking them to review Gaughram's formula. Proceeding on the assumption that the CPI numbers were correct, Petrics concluded
that Gaughram's calculations were accurate. Without further examination of the accountants' review by GH & C, the formula was
accepted and incorporated into the settlement agreement.
Three years later, however, after receiving a notice stating that
an additional increase was about to commence, defendant GH & C
examined Gaughram's previous calculations discovering that they
were inaccurate and that Circle overpaid its rent by $37,699.98. Accordingly, GH & C notified both Gaughram and Circle of the mistake. In April 1988, on behalf of Circle, GH & C initiated a
declaratory action against Masward II seeking to amend the 1985
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settlement agreement to include the proper rental increase calculation, maintaining that a mutual mistake was made by both parties. Id. at 286-87, 662 A.2d at 512.
Because of conflicts of interest, however, GH & C was forced
to withdraw as counsel for Circle and was replaced by the law firm
Blaustein & Wasserman. Id. at 287, 662 A.2d at 512. Although Circle failed to join defendants Petrics and GH & C in the action
against Gaughram, they were called as witness during the reformation litigation. Finding that the calculations, as a matter of law,
were incorrect, and therefore were not the outcome of a mutual
mistake, the trial judge credited Circle the overcharge. Id. at 28788, 662 A.2d at 512.
On September 6, 1991, one year after the reformation litigation, Circle instituted a malpractice action against GH & C, to
which Petrics was later added, claiming that defendants' negligence in inspecting the rental-increase calculations caused the
overpayment of rent and disbursement of unnecessary legal fees
and costs. Id. at 288, 662 A.2d at 512. The trial court granted the
defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed Circle's
claims under the premise that Circle's claims were barred by the
entire controversy doctrine. Id.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, in a divided opinion, affirmed the lower court's holding, applying the discovery rule to
legal malpractice actions. Id. Writing for the majority, Judge Keefe
explained that the plaintiff's malpractice claims accrued in March
1988, after it was informed of the error in rent calculations. Id.
Moreover, the appellate division declared that because the original
reformation litigation contained the argument that a mutual mistake occurred in calculating the rent increase, a malpractice claim
could have been maintained against the defendants as an alternative form of recovery, and thus the subsequent claim was prohibited by the entire controversy doctrine. Id. at 288, 662 A.2d at 51213. In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Stem stressed that the
doctrine as applied in a malpractice action should not be applied
rigidly and thus the plaintiff's claims should not be barred. Id. at
288-89, 662 A.2d at 513.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Circle's petition for
certification and affirmed the appellate division's judgment. Id. at
289, 662 A.2d at 513 (citation omitted). Recognizing that the entire controversy doctrine pertains to legal malpractice claims, the
court announced that the goals and objectives of the doctrine require a client to bring its malpractice actions against the attorney
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during the commencement of the original action, even though the
attorney is presently representing the client in the underlying action. Id. Therefore, the majority held that because Circle learned
that its overpayment of rent was attributed to the defendants
before instituting the original action to reform the lease agreement, it was constructively aware of the malpractice claims against
the defendants. Id. at 298-99, 662 A.2d at 517-18. Thus, the court
concluded, the entire controversy doctrine barred plaintiff's subsequent malpractice suits. Id. at 303, 662 A.2d at 520.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler commenced the
court' s analysis by reaffirming the judicial principles that the entire controversy doctrine promotes the judicial goals of fairness
and efficiency by demanding that all legal controversies arising
from the same set of operating facts be brought in one litigation.
Id. at 289, 662 A.2d at 513 (citing Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 116 N.J. 7,
15, 560 A.2d 1169 (1989)). Moreover, underscoring that the rule
pertains not only to the joinder of parties who have a material interest in the controversy, but also to constituent claims that may
arise during the course of the original action, the majority reminded that the application of the doctrine is discretionary and
that its limits must be clarified in a case-by-case determination. Id.
at 289-90, 662 A.2d at 513 (citation omitted). The court further
commented that the rule should not be imposed if it creates significant unfairness to the litigants or obstructs the presentation of the
legal issues. Id. at 290, 662 A.2d at 513 (citation omitted).
The court first addressed the plaintiff's assertion that an exception to the entire controversy doctrine should be carved out for
claims which entail an attorney's negligent acts occurring within
the specific dispute that is the focus of the original action. Id. at
291, 662 A.2d at 514. Recognizing that the doctrine's application
to claims of this nature embroils concerns which are inherent in
the attorney-client relationship, Justice Handler stressed that the
principles of the doctrine successfully accommodate and resolve
these issues, effectively alleviating the need for an exception. Id.
Focusing on the complications that stem from the relationship and
that are affected by requiring thejoinder of the malpractice claim,
the majority acknowledged that questions arise regarding the accrual of the malpractice cause of action and the client's ability to
identify and respond to the malpractice claim when it arises. Id.
Resolving the first issue, the court remarked that because the
discovery rule applies to malpractice claims and stipulates that the
claim against the attorney accrues when the client learns that he or
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she has been damaged by the attorney's mistake, the client is not
only required to bring the claim within the appropriate statute of
limitations period, but also within the bounds established by the
entire controversy doctrine. Id. Thus, the majority declared,
neither the limitation period nor the confines of the doctrine are
tolled simply because the attorney is responsible for the client's
subsequent legal action. Id.
Referring to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the court further articulated that attorneys have an unwavering ethical duty to
inform a client that he or she might have a cause of action against
that attorney. Id. at 291-92, 662 A.2d at 514 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the court noted that an attorney, upon realizing that a
mistake was made, must inform the client of the mistake and instruct the client that he or she has the right to procure new counsel
and to institute a malpractice claim. Id. at 292, 662 A.2d at 514.
Thus, the majority concluded, enforcing the joinder rule imposed
by the entire controversy doctrine does not unduly frustrate nor
impede the attorney-client relationship because the attorney,
notwithstanding the doctrine, must inform the client of the possible malpractice claim against that attorney. Id.
Next, the court addressed the plaintiff's concern that requiring a client to institute its malpractice action in the pending lawsuit
will cause the client to waive the attorney-client privilege, thus allowing the lawyer to be cross-examined concerning otherwise protected communications involved in the original dispute. Id.
Although Justice Handler verified that the Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Rules of Evidence allow an attorney to divulge
confidential information to establish a legal defense to the malpractice claim, the justice averred that the risks of prejudice to the
client are reduced by additional judicial considerations. Id. at 29293, 662 A.2d at 514-15 (citation omitted). First, the majority articulated that an attorney must make every effort to minimize or avoid
the unnecessary disclosure of confidential information by obtaining protective orders or by limiting the disclosures to only
those who are required to know them. Id. at 293, 662 A.2d at 515
(citation omitted). Additionally, the court reminded that the entire controversy doctrine does not mandate that the malpractice
action be litigated along with the underlying action; rather, it only
requires a party to inform the court of the existence of additional
material parties. Id. (citation omitted). Lastly, arguing that because a trial court is granted the authority to develop a litigation
plan that protects the interests of all parties, the majority asserted
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that the court is empowered to consider the potential detrimental
effects of the joinder of claims with respect to preserving the attorney-client confidences when determining whether the supplementary claim should be joined or reserved. Id. (citations omitted).
Utilizing the entire controversy doctrine's objectives of efficiency and fairness as its guidance, the court concluded that creating an exemption for legal malpractice claims would fail to
promote these goals. Id. at 294, 662 A.2d at 515. Because legal
malpractice claims generally involve the same rights that the initial
litigation sought to resolve, the court expounded, judicial efficiency would be sacrificed if the litigant was permitted to pursue
the malpractice claim separately. Id. Moreover, the majority determined that fairness would not be achieved because without the
legal malpractice claim and its essential parties, the initial action
would be incomplete and would fail to provide an adequate forum
for the comprehensive determination of liability. Id.
After concluding that the entire controversy doctrine generally applies to legal malpractice claims, the court launched into an
analysis of whether the doctrine should be applied to the plaintiff's
action, thus barring the negligence suits against the defendants. Id.
at 299, 662 A.2d at 518. Addressing the goals of the doctrine, the
majority opined that joining both of the defendants as parties to
the reformation litigation would have assisted the trial court in reconciling whether the plaintiff' s overpayment of rent was due to a
mistake of law or the result of the defendants' negligence. Id.
Agreeing with the Appellate Division's findings, Justice Handler
further suggested that the reformation litigation hinged on who, if
anyone, was culpable for the plaintiff's overpayment of rent, thus
making both defendants material parties to that controversy. Id.
Next, focusing on the two objectives of the doctrine, the majority proclaimed that the imposition of the entire controversy doctrine requirements would have fostered judicial efficiency and
economy because both the reformation litigation and the malpractice suits were comprised of the same operating facts, causing a relitigation of the identical issues. Id. Thus, because the plaintiffs
malpractice claims against the defendants accrued when it was first
notified of the defendants' mistakes in reviewing the calculations,
the court insisted that the preclusive effect of the doctrine should
apply and bar the subsequent litigation. Id.
Agreeing with the majority that the attorney malpractice
claims should not be exempted from the entire controversy doctrine, Justice Stein, writing for the dissent, charged that principles
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of fairness demand that the preclusive effects of the doctrine
should not be applied against the plaintiff. Id. at 304, 662 A.2d at
520 (Stein, J., dissenting). Re-articulating the goals of the entire
controversy doctrine, the Justice noted that accepted legal mores
require that plaintiffs are provided a full opportunity to have their
claims adjudicated on the merits. Id. at 304-05, 662 A.2d at 520-21
(Stein, J., dissenting). Thus, concluding that Circle acted reasonably in deciding not to join the defendants as parties to the original
reformation litigation, the dissent stressed that the interests ofjustice would not be served by strictly adhering to the doctrine and by
barring the plaintiffs malpractice claims. Id. at 305, 662 A.2d at
521 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Reviewing the facts of the case, Justice Stein probed Circle's
actions to determine whether it acted reasonably when deciding
not to join the defendants as parties to the reformation litigation.
Id. at 305-06, 662 A.2d at 521. Recognizing that legal malpractice
claims are derived from negligence theories, the dissent focused
on the discovery rule, surveying whether the plaintiff was injured at
the time of the original litigation. Id. at 306, 662 A.2d at 521 (Stein,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Disagreeing with the majority,
Justice Handler concluded that the plaintiffs injuries did not become apparent until after the close of the original lawsuit. Id. at
307, 662 A.2d at 522 (Stein, J., dissenting). Because Circle was reasonable in assuming that both the excessive rental payments and
the attorney's costs associated with litigating that action would be
recovered by a favorable determination, the dissent proffered, Circle's damages did not manifest themselves at the time it filed the
reformation litigation. Id. at 307-08, 662 A.2d at 522 (Stein, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Stein charged that the majority's imposition of the entire controversy doctrine contravened the principles
of fairness. Id. at 309-10, 662 A.2d at 523 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Although the majority's intention of applying the entire controversy doctrine to attorney malpractice claims to promote efficiency and fairness in the judicial system is meritorious, the New
Jersey Supreme Court fails to realize that requiring the client to
institute the malpractice claim against its acting attorney presents a
contradiction in logic. As the dissent correctly noted, within the
judicial process the attorney traditionally becomes its client's confidant, charged with the responsibility of aggressively fighting for the
client's best interests. By compelling clients to join malpractice actions with the original litigation, however, the court creates an environment where the attorney stands before the judge or jury,
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representing the interests of the client while at the same time being compelled to protect his or her own interests. Thus, the majority' s decision unjustly compels the client to decide whether he or
she should retain the attorney for the original litigation, thereby
relinquishing all rights to bring any potential malpractice claims,
or acquire new representation and join the first attorney in the
litigation.
Daniel M. Seniss

